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Whilst emissions trading systems are widely held to be able to deliver lowest-cost 
abatement, uncertainty reduces their effectiveness. We consider a new scheme, 
the  Tender-Price  Allocation  Mechanism,  which  focuses  carbon  factor  cost 
expenditure on abatement rather than just revenue transfers. It is a scheme that 
reduces uncertainty and the costs of uncertainty for both firms and regulators. 
It also incorporates a suite of incentives that compensates for the externalities 
associated with abatement investment.  2 
 
Section 1  Introduction 
In Australia and internationally, we have witnessed intense discussions concerning the best 
policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main proposals are a carbon tax (CT) and 
an emissions trading system (ETS). The latter is favoured over the former mainly because, 
first, it can set a reduction target and, second, because increasing taxation is never palatable 
politically. The debate concerning the relative merits of these policies has tended to crowd out 
discussions about alternative schemes. This is surprising because both policies have potential 
problems, both in implementation and in achieving their goals. The ETS is a ‘quota’ policy 
which deviates from economists’ preference for ‘tariff’ schemes, particularly in the context of 
international trade. Also, since both are ‘stick’ rather than ‘carrot’ policies that raise prices 
that are passed on to consumers, they depend upon there being a high enough price elasticity 
of demand to achieve significant reductions in demand. If demand is price inelastic then little 
will be achieved without very high increases in a carbon price with serious consequences for 
low income consumers. In particular, neither scheme addresses the consequences of increased 
cost or decreased emission reduction as a result of uncertainty. 
A long time ago, Martin Weitzman (Weitzman, 1978) argued that, in states of uncertainty, it 
is necessary to have policies that involve both price and quantity mechanisms: “…far from 
being a contradiction, is actually optimal in a world of uncertainty” (Weitzman, 1978, p688). 
Weitzman pointed to policies to control pollution as a clear case in point. Instead of pursuing 
Weitzman’s  findings,  we  have  had  an  ‘either-or’  debate,  with  the  ETS  supported  by 
proponents  of  free  markets  and  small  government  and  the  CT  by  those  who  expect 
government  to direct private enterprise through the introduction of regulatory systems that 
include both corrective incentives and penalties. Often overlooked by the pro-market lobby, 
but stressed by the late Arthur Okun in his book Prices and Quantities (Okun, 1981), and 3 
 
echoed by Joseph Stigitz (Stiglitz, 2002), we are never dealing with an economy guided by 
the  ‘invisible  hand’  but  one  where  there  is  a  necessary  ‘invisible  handshake’  between 
interacting parties in the economy, including those between the private and public sectors. 
What this handshake involves is the active participation of government in the establishment of 
regulatory arrangements that facilitate economic activity that otherwise wouldn’t be possible 
and,  in  so  doing,  allowing  private  sector  agents  to  take  advantage  of  new,  innovative 
opportunities.  
So, Weitzman has provided a convincing argument that a hybrid price/quantity scheme is 
necessary to curb atmospheric pollution.  Currently, one exists, proposed by McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen (MW) (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002), so it is worth discussing its advantages and 
disadvantages before moving on to our proposal. The MW proposal involves the allocation of 
long-term emission permits to specified thresholds, plus annual permits, sold to reduce the 
costs associated with excessive permit demand. The mechanism aims at a quantity target but 
is overlaid with a price mechanism as a ‘safety valve’. The requirement for long-term permits 
to emit is based on the premise that there is no damage from emissions until certain thresholds 
are breached, and that permits to emit should be allocated up to the level of what is assumed 
to be an allowable threshold.  Only emissions over and above the allowable threshold are then 
penalized to bring emissions back to the threshold. Whilst different ways of allocating the 
long-term permits are identified, their preferred method is to allocate free ‘grandfathered’ 
permits. This is designed to garner political and industrial support for the scheme and avoids 
large revenue transfers to government (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002).  
The MW mechanism is prompted by a need to minimize costs, but it has a number of aspects 
that will cause it to be unsuccessful.  The first relates to the international allocation of the 
long-term permits to owners with vested property-rights. Any reduction in quantity targets 
would require a buy-back of these long-term permits, which could come at a substantial social 4 
 
cost.
1 The second aspect is the assumption that damages will only happen over an allowable 
threshold. It is illogical to place no or little cost on the millions of tons that are emitted prior 
to a threshold-breach in a world where carbon dioxide concentration is rising.  Also, since 
there is a great deal of uncertainty around the allowable threshold, this uncertainty increases 
risk and therefore the cost of valuable property rights. The final aspect is the preference for an 
allocation of free permits.  Evidence from the EU ETS and the US SOx programs is that free 
emission  allocations  do  not  drive  investments  in  new  abatement  technologies  in  any 
significant way (Carlson et al., 2000, Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006).  
Underlying the MW model is a concern that the science underpinning the effects of CO2 
emissions  is  still  uncertain  and  contestable,  implying  that  it  would  be  costly  to  act 
prematurely.  It focuses on a business-as-usual approach until the climate science becomes 
clearer,  when  the  required  action  can  be  determined.  Experience  from  the  EU  ETS 
implementation shows, however, that basing allocations on business-as-usual emissions leads 
to inflated emission projections, windfall profits for polluters and limited abatement (Grubb 
and Neuhoff, 2006).  So, although there is merit in the MW hybrid proposal its cautious 
approach to climate change and generosity to polluters suggests that its capacity to reduce 
emissions significantly in the coming decade is questionable. In particular, it does not involve 
strong incentives for firms to invest in abatement technologies in the near term. We argue 
that, without such incentives, reaching even modest abatement targets will be very difficult. 
The Tender-Price Allocation Mechanism (TPAM) proposal that we offer here is much more 
ambitious and has a range of attractive features. It is a scheme where the government appoints 
an independent regulator to manage an incentive structure that has both price and quantity 
effects. But, instead of letting a market or a policy determine a carbon price, it is determined 
                                                
1 Australian buy-back of water rights in the Murray Darling Basin is proving very costly. 5 
 
by a rule, providing certainty in the private sector and reducing the need for an army of 
expensive traders and advisors in a new speculative market. In other words, in our scheme, a 
regulator sets price and the private sector tenders quantity. The scheme is designed to be 
neutral - polluters fund investors in pollution mitigation - and is entirely fenced off from the 
fiscal position of government so that there is no capacity to do a carbon ‘tax grab’ to finance 
other deficits, as recently suggested by Nordhaus for the US (Nordhaus, 2010). Importantly, 
our  calculations  suggest  that  the  impact  of  the  scheme  on  electricity  costs  would  be  to 
increase the average electricity generation cost by a modest 2.7c/kWh and that the incentive 
for power generators to shift technologies is strong.            
Significantly, any charge levied on carbon emissions is treated as a factor cost not as a tax. 
Thus, investments to mitigate emissions are treated like any other innovative investment to 
reduce  factor  cost.  However,  because  investors  in  abatement  technology  are  faced  with 
uncertainty,  not  quantifiable  risk,  we  know  that  they  won’t  apply  standard  discounting 
techniques. In such circumstances, there are two drivers of investment behaviour: strategic 
considerations and the quality of information. The former relates to first mover advantages 
and early demonstrations of commitment to potential competitors. The latter relates to the 
quality of information relating to the expected profitability of the investment that is available. 
The  first  is  about  making  brave  entrepreneurial  decisions  and  the  second  is  about 
conservatively deferring them.  
It is well known that the unit costs associated with new technologies fall over time as scale of 
application increases and incremental innovations occur. However, what is not known is how 
much these costs will fall and how long this will take. So, for example, it may pay to wait to 
invest in solar technology following the reasoning of Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  The problem 
with this is that uncertainty leads to under-investment and a distributional shift away from 
those brave (or foolhardy) enough to invest when costs are high to those who enjoy lower 6 
 
costs later. In such circumstances, incentives are necessary that compensate early investors for 
the  unusually  high  risks  that  they  take  and  this  compensation  should  come  from  those 
deferring risk and, in this case continuing to pollute.  
Of  course,  patents  and  copyrights  are  designed  to  advantage  early  investors  in  new 
technologies but these rarely protect an entrepreneur who is bringing technologies together 
within novel organisational structures. Furthermore, there are usually pressures brought to 
bear  by  owners  of  existing  technologies,  who  face  ‘creative  destruction,’  seeking 
compensation for impending losses. This adds to the uncertainty faced by entrepreneurs trying 
to kick start a new technology.  The problem with both an ETS and a CT is that they both 
impose a greater cost in the short- and medium-term on the firms that are investing in carbon 
abatement than on those who are doing nothing. Indeed, latter can enjoy free permits in some 
ETS proposals and still not actively pursue abatement.   
Now, it may still be true that a carbon price triggers an investment, but this may not result in 
lowest-cost abatement. An ETS triggers uncertainty about the cost of permits
2, a CT involves 
uncertainty  about  the  cost  of  future  policy  and  neither  an  ETS  nor  a  CT  address  the 
uncertainty associated with the cost of research to transition to low-carbon technology
3; but 
these  uncertainties  defer  investment  (Dixit  and  Pindyck,  1994)  and  drive  up  the  cost  of 
abatement. A focus on the property rights of pollution fails to reflect the social benefit of 
abatement. If firms can provide evidence of abatement investment which delivers a social 
                                                
2 There is evidence of worst-case scenarios of uncertainty, eg the RECLAIM market for NOx emissions in 
Southern California resulted in uncontrollable permit price escalation KEOHANE, N. O. (2009) Cap and trade, 
rehabilitated: Using tradable permits to control U.S. greenhouse gases. Review of Environmental Economics and 
Policy, 3, 42-62., or the EU ETS carbon market resulted in uncontrollable permit price slide GRUBB, M. & 
NEUHOFF,  K.  (2006)  Emissions  trading  &  competitiveness  :  allocations,  incentives  and  industrial 
competitiveness under the EU emissions trading scheme, London, Earthscan Publications. 
3 Montgomery finds that there is a “dynamic inconsistency” in incentives to invest in abatement for both a price 
and a quantity mechanism MONTGOMERY, W. D. & SMITH, A. E. (2005) Price, Quantity and Technology 
Strategies for Climate Change Policy.  CRA International..  Jaffe points to investment  market failure which 
discourages investment in environmentally friendly technologies JAFFE, A. B., NEWELL, R. G. & STAVINS, 
R. N. (2005) A tale of two market failures: Technology and environmental policy. Ecological Economics, 54, 
164-174. 7 
 
benefit, there should be no penalties levelled at them in the form of emission permit purchases 
or carbon taxes. A carbon price should be levied only at those that do not invest to abate. This 
is what TPAM seeks to achieve. As we shall show, the benefits of TPAM are many, but can 
be  summarized  as:  bringing  abatement  investment  forward;  reducing  revenue  transfers; 
reducing the cost outlay for firms; reducing knowledge investment by firms in an auction 
market; and dramatically reducing  all the uncertainties, costs and opportunistic  behaviour 
inherent in the auction mechanism. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the details of the Tender-
Price Allocation Mechanism, provides a detailed analysis of Marginal Abatement Costs and 
conducts  a  sensitivity  analysis  on  some  of  the  key  variables.  Section  3  analyses  the 
effectiveness  of  TPAM,  compares  it  to  other  mechanisms,  provides  evidence  from  the 
literature  of  the  efficiency  of  combined  tax-subsidy  programs  and  discusses  the  possible 
shortcomings of the mechanism; Section 4 contains concluding remarks. 
Section 2  The Tender-Price Allocation Mechanism (TPAM) 
A carbon price (permit purchase or tax) is a payment for the use of a public resource. Thus, it 
is a factor cost. But buying a permit from someone who is ‘under-polluting’ is a zero sum 
game, environmentally. Government can restrict the quota of permits traded, thus, pushing up 
the price (or set a tax to reduce use) but this will only be effective if the higher price causes 
new investments in carbon abatement by polluters. This will only occur if polluters can pass 
on the carbon cost. If the ultimate consumer has a price inelastic demand, then a quota can 
only be attained at a very high carbon price, with serious effects on low income consumers.  
The  introduction  of  a  carbon  price  through  the  Climate  Change  Levy  (CCL)  in  the  UK 
provided evidence of gaps between the predictions of economic theory and experience from 8 
 
the real world. The CCL should have encouraged ‘rational’ firms to pursue energy efficiency 
in response to a price signal, but firms’ failed to act, requiring extra incentives to change their 
behaviour  (House  of  Commons  Environmental  Audit  Committee,  2008).  Firms’  focus  on 
short-term profitability (Sennett, 2006, Murphy, 1985), average cost pricing (Lucas, 1999) 
and  a  “sunk  cost  bias”(Al-Najjar  et  al.,  2005)  exhibit  behaviour  which  is  not  geared  to 
investment with long pay-back periods. So observed real world behaviour suggests that a 
simple price signal is not enough to overcome disincentives to investment in abatement. Thus, 
there have to be significant incentives to encourage polluters to introduce carbon abating 
technologies if quotas are to be met at acceptable carbon (and electricity) prices. 
The  TPAM  scheme  involves  an  independent  Regulator  who  estimates  what  the  cost  of 
meeting an abatement target would be (Control Cost), in the absence of private abatement, for 
a given period. This yields a Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) which becomes the threshold 
against  which  the  Regulator  assesses  tenders  by  firms  to  abate.  The  Carbon  Price  is  the 
Regulator’s estimated cost of abatement per tonne of emissions for the country. In order to 
tender, firms
4 are required to calculate their Carbon Cost, (i.e., the Carbon Price x projected 
emissions) and project the abatement that they can achieve by investing in carbon abatement 
technologies. Firms that are able to tender abatement at less than the threshold MAC are 
eligible for free permits to pollute.  Those firms that are unable to meet the threshold level of 
abatement are required to purchase permits for all their emissions over the entire period. 
2.1  The microeconomic principles of TPAM 
 Effectively the target, or quota, associated with a carbon price introduces a ‘penalty’ scheme. 
History is full of failed quota schemes administered by governments. High prices, induced by 
                                                
4 To avoid excessive transaction costs, only the major emitters could be covered, like the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme. This will increase the cost to firms as abatement will be required of a smaller country total. 
To reduce the cost impact it could be beneficial to include agriculture and land-use change as block groups. 9 
 
quota  schemes,  have  provided  strong  incentives  to  breach  the  quota  through  product 
differentiation,  geographic  relocation,  illegal  trading,  falsification  of  records,  etc.  In  the 
context of the ‘invisible handshake,’ quota rationing in peacetime has always been viewed as 
unfair  expropriation  by  consumers  and  something  to  oppose  and  undermine.  It  is  only 
acceptable if it is understood that the goal is to transfer revenue to solve a widely accepted 
social problem. So, rationing and high prices in wartime are accepted, not because they deter 
excessive consumption but because it is accepted that resources have to be transferred to the 
war effort. So, to be acceptable, a charge on carbon must be seen to have a direct and visible 
effect on investment in carbon abatement.  
To  understand  how  this  works  with  TPAM,  let  us  begin  by  looking  at  a  typical  firm’s 
position. Consider a simple profit (π) function for a firm in the face of an ETS or a CT: 
   
Equation 1 
Where  
Q:  Quantity produced 
P:  Price of quantity produced 
C:  Cost of quantity produced 
E:  Carbon Price (permit or tax) 
i:  Emissions intensity of quantity produced(function of KA) 
n:  Number of years in program 
z:  Life expectancy of abatement technology 
KA:  Cost of investment in abatement (function of E) 
 
The  hope  is  that  the  introduction  of  a  carbon  price  (E)  will  cause  the  firm  to  increase 
investment KA and, in turn, this will decrease emission intensity i, which may, or may not 
decrease emissions depending on how much Q grows. Thus, there is a two way relationship, 
with the cost of investment, KA, influencing the cost of carbon, EiQ, and carbon price, E, 10 
 
influencing investment, KA. The firm clearly has two costs it has to bear, one compulsory 
EiQ,  and another, KA, that is chosen. The sensitivity of KA to E will depend upon the ease 
with  which  the  carbon  cost  can  be  passed  on  and,  ultimately,  the  price  sensitivity  of 
consumers. So, it is a private choice as to how much KA will be and, thus, how much carbon 
is abated. In theory, the carbon price rises until it is high enough to generate the target amount 
of abatement. Unless the carbon price is high, it will not be worth the extra investment to 
abate, particularly in an uncertain environment where the logical thing to do is wait. But the 
problem is that, with pass-on and price inelasticity of demand, this could be a very high, and 
politically unacceptable, price.  
Thus, there is a gap between a socially-optimal carbon price and a socially-acceptable carbon 
price. TPAM provides a formal mechanism to fund abatement in the presence of this gap, 
whereby a firm is relieved of all of its EiQ (Carbon Cost) liability if the abatement that it 
tenders to the Regulator, representing investment KA, delivers cost-effective abatement, such 
that the firm’s profit function is reduced to: 
   
Equation 2 
Requiring firms to tender competitively for free permits to emit assumes that the firms that are 
successful in proving their abatement potential would meet a minimum condition: 
   
Equation 3 
Or looked at another way, where a firm can provide low-cost abatement, the cost associated 
with the public bad (Carbon Cost = -EiQ) is equated to the cost of the public good (carbon 
subsidy = +EiQ), as long as expenditure on abatement, ( )KA, is maximized.   If firms are 
unable to tender cost-effective abatement, the EiQ revenue received from those polluters can 
be channelled to firms as a subsidy for additional levels of efficient abatement.  Figure 1 11 
 
provides an illustration of Equation 3.  








Regulator Electricity Cement Steel
Carbon 
Cost/tCO2e
Carbon Expense / tCO2e Abatement investment/tCO2e Subsidy/tCO2e
 
Figure 1: Cost of Carbon 
At a $25 Carbon Price, the electricity generator tenders to provide 33% abatement, the cement 
manufacturer 26%, and the steel-maker 10% abatement. Where the abatement tendered is 
better  than  a  Regulator  threshold  (in  Figure  1,  15%  abatement),  the  firm’s  Carbon  Cost 
obligation could be applied, not to the purchase of permits, but to expenditure on abatement. 
In effect, the firm receives a subsidy because of the social benefits of its abatement strategy. 
The carbon subsidy will only apply to those firms offering lowest-cost abatement. In this 
example, the electricity generator and the cement manufacturer receive a $25/tCO2e carbon 
subsidy to cover $25/tCO2e of their abatement expenditure and the steel maker receives no 
subsidy,  but  can  still  pursue  abatement  if  a  private  benefit  is  identified  because  of  the 
existence of a Carbon Price. 
The award of subsidies through TPAM lacks the simplicity of a decision rule that relates 
MAC to Carbon Price, but it reduces outlays on environmental costs and gains environmental 
integrity. This is because a permit/tax system forces firms to fund both abatement investment 
and Carbon Cost, duplicating firms’ environmental costs and resulting in investment inertia. 12 
 
Investment decisions based only on the relationship between MAC and Carbon Price will not 
direct abatement to the optimum social benefit. The challenge for the mechanism is to ensure 
that firms apply all of EiQ to abatement and don’t engage in strategic behaviour to increase 
profits at the cost of abatement. With TPAM this challenge is addressed by a competitive 
tender process, in that firms will be incentivised to disclose valuable information through the 
potential award of subsidies.  
2.2  Calculating marginal abatement cost 
The Regulator must estimate the expenditure that would be required to reach an abatement 
target in the absence of private abatement.  Once this is established, a threshold Marginal Cost 




TKA:  Full capital cost of purchase of technology to achieve abatement 
TA:  Total abatement of tCO2e over period 
 
Investment in abatement is an attempt to reduce a factor cost, i.e. the charge, in the form of a 
carbon price, by society for the use of its resource. Treating investment in abatement as a 
factor cost, changes its financial application.  It can be understood as being funded from 
savings in production costs (i.e. not paying a carbon price), so such expenditure is focussed on 
saving factor costs rather than investing in future revenue earning potential. For this reason, 
the expenditure on technology to abate is a cost of abatement, not a cost of capital. 
There is no inclusion of interest expense for the same reason that expenditure on abatement 
technology is a cost of production and not a cost of capital. Funds are applied as savings are 
made. For instance if a firm invests an amount that would have, instead, been a carbon price 13 
 
payment, the opportunity cost of abatement expenditure replaces the opportunity cost of the 
carbon price, so there is no net opportunity cost or interest rate increase from abatement 
investment. 




TA:  Emissions(annual) abated 
Se:  Emissions(annual) at end of period 
Sb:  Emissions(annual) at beginning of period 
n:  Length of period, in years 
 
A much more complicated calculation would include increased annual emissions as a result of 
growth and decreased annual emissions as a result of abatement investment at unspecified 
points during the period.  However, in the interests of simplicity and clarity of demonstration, 
a simpler calculation method is employed here. Whilst this may appear to be an unusual 
method for calculating abatement, as long as the same methodology is used by the Regulator 
and the firms, it is effective and unlikely to affect the efficiency of the allocation.  If the 
Regulator wishes to maximize abatement during the period, it can issue permits to an annual 
emission level after abatement or at an optimum point during the period. As firms will still 
have to surrender  permits equal to their annual  emissions,  this will ensure that firms are 
incentivised to abate as soon as possible to reduce the use of permits that will have value in 
the next period. 
2.3  Competing to abate 
After the Regulator calculates the Carbon Price, it is published so that firms can plan the 
abatement that they seek to achieve over a fixed period (let us assume 10 years) and tender 14 
 
their abatement bid to the Regulator. Once all tenders are submitted, the Regulator aggregates 
the abatement offered.  As can be seen from Figure 2, the Regulator’s MAC then becomes the 
threshold.  Those  firms  that  offer  abatement  below  the  Regulator’s  Marginal  Cost  of 
Abatement (MAC), will be eligible for permits to emit free of charge for the whole period, as 
a social contribution to their investment expenditure. Otherwise, firms will be required to pay 
the Carbon Price times their actual emissions to the Regulator annually for the 10 year period.  
In Figure 2 illustrative MACs are provided. Assume that the Regulator’s MAC is $100, the 
electricity generator has a MAC of $76, the cement manufacturer a MAC of $96 and the steel 
manufacturer  a  MAC  of  $250.  In  this  case,  the  electricity  generator  and  the  cement 
manufacturer  would  pay  no  Carbon  Price  but  would  contract  to  deliver  33%  and  26% 













15% 33% 26% 10%
MAC
Abatement tendered
MAC Carbon Price Threshold MAC
 
Figure 2: Permits allocated based on abatement offered 
Where firms can supply cost-effective abatement, they are eligible for free permits that can be 
called  Tier  1  subsidies.  In  some  cases,  firms  may  be  capable  of  offering  even  greater 
abatement  than  that  which  is  achievable  by  investing  their  Carbon  Cost.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  is  efficient  to  provide  further  subsidies  to  these  firms  to  ensure  that 15 
 
additional abatement is achieved through additional expenditure at a MAC lower than the 
Regulator’s threshold, or other firms’, MAC.  For this reason, it is important to understand 
where more efficient abatement can be pursued within each firm. Therefore as part of the 
Tender process, all firms should provide at least 4 different abatement scenarios.  
•  The first scenario will detail the abatement possible by investing the Carbon Cost 
(projected emissions times Carbon Price) in abatement. (Cheapest budget) 
•  The second scenario will detail the abatement possible using an ‘open cheque-book’ 
approach  to  abatement,  i.e.,  spend  whatever  is  required  to  maximize  abatement. 
(Largest abatement)  
•  The  third  scenario  will  detail  the  highest  abatement  possible  at  the  lowest  cost. 
(Lowest MAC) 
•  The fourth scenario will detail the abatement preferred by the firm which may involve 
an  optimisation  of  maximized  abatement  with  minimized  cost  and  other  factors 
pertinent to the firm. (Optimised) 
The provision of this information will demonstrate MAC curves for each firm at different 
levels of technological investment. It establishes the basis for the award of Tier 2 subsidies to 
firms to maximize country abatement at lowest-cost. Once the Regulator has collected and 
aggregated  the  reported  MACs  and  the  abatement  information  offered  by  the  tenders, 
decisions can be made as to which firms should be required to pay the Carbon Cost to the 
Regulator for the period, which firms should be given free permits for the period, and which 
firms should be provided with additional subsidies for abatement because it is efficient to 
invest in abatement with those firms rather than pursue any other form of abatement. 
2.4   Rolling out TPAM in Australia: examining the benefits of subsidies to 
the electricity sector  
Emissions reduction faces a four-way trade-off between lowest MAC, lowest Carbon Price, 16 
 
highest abatement and highest investment. As highlighted by McKinsey & Co, the electricity 
sector has the highest need for investment to reach its abatement potential (McKinsey, 2009) 
but, equally, it faces strong competition for investment funds, high infrastructure debt, high 
emissions intensity and output pricing constraints. With the electricity sector’s potential to 
substantially reduce national carbon emissions, it is logical for the Regulator to use abatement 
in electricity generation as its Control Cost in the absence of private abatement. A simple 
model using current data has been constructed to provide top-down cost estimates of meeting 
growth  requirements,  and  replacing  coal-fired  generation  with  Concentrated  Solar  Tower 
Power (CSTP), Wind Power and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generation
5.   
 
Figure 3: Generation Technology Comparison 
What  the  model  illuminates,  is  that  whilst  CCGT,  CSTP  and  Wind  Power  all  deliver 
abatement, their abatement potentials are vastly different. Figure 3 gives a comparison of 
                                                
5 The companion suite of CCGT, CSTP and Wind Power is chosen because both CCGT and CSTP can generate 
base-load power. CCGT is low-emitting, low capital cost, technologically stable, whilst CSTP is no-carbon, 
technologically proven and able to meet peak-load requirements. As Wind Power is cheaper than CSTP, it is 
included as an option to reduce the overall cost of providing renewable electricity. See appendix for more detail. 17 
 
abatement  potential  and  marginal  abatement costs  over  the  period  of TPAM.  What  is  of 
particular note is that because there is growth in generation (an estimated 12GW by 2021), no 
abatement is achieved over the period of TPAM by investing in only CCGT, until 23% of 
coal-fired plant is replaced. Because of the potential for additional emissions from growth-
related generation, it is cheaper (lower MAC) to abate by investing in CSTP than CCGT until 
44% of coal-fired plant is replaced.  Another point to note is that 7.6GW of coal generation 
(26%) will be 40 years old, and 0.9GW of diesel generation will be 30 years old, by the end of 
2021 which would indicate that it would be beneficial to replace at least those older facilities 
with new, low-carbon plant. Included for reference in Figure 3 is the abatement potential of 
Ultra Super Critical coal generation which can be seen as being unable to deliver abatement 
until  100%  of  the  existing  coal-fired  stock  is  replaced,  and  then  only  2%  abatement  is 
achieved.  
To decrease the cost of abatement whilst maximising abatement potential, TPAM scenarios 
have been constructed as assorted combinations of CCGT/CSTP/Wind Power technologies 
rather than purely lowest-cost abatement. The possible Regulator Control Cost scenarios are 
summarised  in Table 1.  The  Regulator could produce any number of such scenarios and 
choose the one  that best  suited its objectives.  Here the Optimised option  seeks to  boost 
renewable electricity generation at a price that the economy could sustain. It does however 
cost more than it would cost to replace coal-fired generation with only CCGT. Investing only 
in  CCGT  caps  abatement  and  does  not  allow  the  development  of  new  industry,  so  the 
difference  represents  a  subsidy  to  develop  base-load  renewable  electricity  and  to  boost 
abatement past the limits of CCGT. Equally, it would not be feasible to follow the Lowest 
MAC scenario because this scenario requires the replacement of all coal-fired generation with 
Wind Power which is not feasible as Wind Power does not provide base-load power. If we 
were to assume that the preference was to pursue the Optimised scenario then the Regulator 
would invest in a combination of CSTP and Wind Power, MAC threshold would be $93, the 18 
 
country abatement target would be 20%, the electricity sector could achieve 57% abatement 
over a 10 year period, at a cost that equates to $24.10 per tCO2e for large CO2 emitters. 

















for growth  0.3%  $1,940  $36,851  7.74  60%  40%  1% 
Solar replaces 
40 yr old plant  8%  $164  $83,765  17.60  100%  0%  27% 
CCGT replaces 
all coal  14%  $62  $50,877  10.69  0%  0%  100% 
Combination 
replaces 65%  15%  $93  $87,023  18.28  40%  22%  65% 
OPTIMISED  
(66% renew)  20%  $93  $114,729  24.10  60%  40%  65% 
Lowest  MAC 
(Only wind)  31%  $55  $104,693  21.99  0%  100%  100% 
LARGEST 
ABATEMENT  35%  $84  $180,512  37.92  60%  40%  100% 
  
$1,940















































Figure 4: Regulator's Marginal Abatement Cost Curve 
                                                
6 Abatement cost is the investment cost less the present value of any private benefit from marginal cost changes 
in future periods as a result of reduced fuel costs. For a detailed explanation see Appendix. 19 
 
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of the Regulator MAC curve at different Carbon 
Prices. Note that MAC cost initially increases as renewable generation is implemented and 
then  decreases  as  additional  abatement  is  pursued  through  the  replacement  of  coal-fired 
generation, followed by small increases resulting from more aggressive technology scenarios. 
As  McHugh  has  highlighted,  abatement  cost  calculations  represent  “skipping  across 
technologies to change levels of emissions reductions” (McHugh, 1985, p59) rather than a 
predictably smooth upward curve with increasing abatement. He found that the Pigouvian 
level of tax and the net cost of control can be reduced by subsidizing firms to spend on 
technology  stretching  innovations  rather  than  infra-marginal  cost-reducing  technology 
(McHugh,  1985).  The  benefit  of  increasing  expenditure  to  pursue  technology  stretching 
innovations rather than affordable, but limited, abatement becomes apparent. 
Having  completed  the  Control  Cost  assessment,  the  Regulator  would  turn  to  the  tender 
process. The electricity sector will, again, be used for illustration.  
Table 2: Abatement without Tier 2 subsidies 
  Regulator  Electricity 
sector 
Annual Abatement  123MtCO2e  82MtCO2e 
Abatement % Electricity Sector  57%  38% 
Abatement % Country  20%  14% 
Carbon price  $24.10  $25 
Carbon cost  $115 billion  $54 billion 
Marginal cost of abatement  $93  $65 
As  can  be  seen  from  Table  2,  if  $115  billion  were  spent  in  the  electricity  sector,  57% 
abatement could be achieved in the sector which equates to 20% abatement for the country. 
However,  if  $54  billion  (the  total  Carbon  Cost  to  the  electricity  sector)  is  spent  in  the 
electricity sector, the sector is likely to replace coal-fired generation with relatively cheap 
CCGT generation only. Whilst this gains abatement in the short-term, it hamstrings Australia 20 
 
with an ongoing 107MtCO2e of emissions per annum (20% of its total emissions) for the next 
30 years. The only way that abatement can be increased is: if the Regulator itself builds 
renewable electricity generation with funds received from non-or-low abaters and goes into 
competition with existing electricity generators; or if the electricity generators indicate what 
their abatement potential is at increased levels of abatement expenditure, so that there is a 
possibility that Tier 2 subsidies can be awarded to individual electricity generators where the 
additional  funds  will  lead  to  increased  levels  of  abatement  and  increased  investment  in 
renewable energy. 
We turn now to a more detailed view of the workings of Tier 2 subsidies when we consider a 
large  Brown  Coal  Generator  (1600MW  generating  capacity).  The  firm  does  not  plan  an 
increase in generation capacity over the 10 year period.  The tender lodged with the Regulator 
could be: 
















Abatement  72%  100%  50% 
Annual emissions 
reduced (MtCO2e)  14  19  9 
MAC  $35  $50  $50 
Cost of abatement  $4.7 billion  $9.5 bn  $4.7bn 
Public funding reqd  $0  $4.8 bn  $0 bn 
It can be seen from Table 3 above, that all scenarios deliver a MAC that is less than the 
Regulator’s  MAC.  The  challenge  is  to  award  subsidies  for  the  scenarios  that  deliver 
abatement at the lowest cost to the Regulator. If the Generator spent its Carbon Cost, it could 
achieve 72% abatement from replacing all of its 8 generating units with CCGT or it could 
achieve 50%  abatement from replacing 4 of  its generating units  with  CSTP.   Whichever 21 
 
technology is employed by the Brown Coal Generator, it is beneficial for the Regulator to 
award a Tier 1 subsidy to the Brown Coal Generator.  
As the Brown Coal Generator’s Largest Abatement scenario provides for abatement at a 
cost-effective MAC, it is cost effective for the Regulator to consider Tier 2 subsidies to the 
Brown Coal Generator. Eliminating all emissions from the Brown Coal Generator, would 
require $4.8 billion in additional funds. As the MAC of this scenario is less than the Regulator 
MAC, it would be a cost effective option. The award of Tier 2 subsidies for abatement will 
however be dependent on the cost of abatement offered by the other tenders.   
For  comparison,  let  us  consider  the  tender  that  might  be  lodged  by  a  Black  Coal-Gas 
Generator with a generation capacity of 3,500MW, of which 2,800MW was fired by black 
coal.  








ABATEMENT  OPTIMISED  
Abatement  14%  43%  100%  48% 
Annual emissions 
reduced (MtCO2e)  3  8  18  9 
MAC  $179  $58  $97  $90 
Cost of abatement  $4.5 billion  $4.5 bn  $17.6 bn  $7.8 bn 
Public funding reqd  $0  $0   $13.1 bn  $3.3 bn 
Here,  the  Black  Coal-Gas  Generator  offers  a  Cheapest  Budget  tender  to  provide  2% 
additional capacity and replace an old 500MW coal-fired power station with CSTP providing 
3MtCO2e of abatement at a cost of $4.5 bn and a MAC of $179.  A MAC of $179 is higher 
than the Regulator’s threshold MAC, so it is cost-effective for the Regulator to require the 
Black Coal-Gas Generator to pay its Carbon Cost to the Regulator and for the Regulator to 
award a Tier 2 subsidy to the Brown Coal Generator to deliver the Brown Coal Generator’s 
Largest  Abatement  scenario.  It  is  however  unlikely  that  the  Regulator  would  trade-off 22 
 
generators against each other like this, as the source of Tier 2 subsidies is more likely to come 
from the transport sector,  although the threat of trade-offs like this is likely to induce truth-
telling by generators. The Regulator is therefore more likely to consider supplying the Black 
Coal-Gas Generator with a Tier 2 subsidy as either Lowest MAC or Optimised scenarios 
provide lower MAC’s than the Regulator’s MAC.  
Using  the  Carbon  Price  to  transition  the  electricity  generators  to  low-carbon  technology 
radiates benefits to the rest of the economy in the form of certainty of supply and price of 
electricity when facing carbon-constraints. So in the event that non-electricity sector firms 
miss  out  on  subsidies  in  favour  of  investment  in  renewable  electricity  generation,  non-
electricity sector firms will still benefit from those subsidies in the form of improved, low-
carbon electricity for the future. Providing Tier 2 subsidies to a Brown Coal Generator to 
achieve  50%  or  even  100%  abatement  at  the  lowest  MAC  is  efficient,  and  allows  the 
Generator to: turn over high-carbon assets to low-carbon assets; reduce its Carbon Cost in 
subsequent abatement periods; and limit electricity cost increases due to the small factor costs 
associated with renewable energy. 
A generator’s high-carbon generating capacity will, as a shift to low carbon generation occurs, 
have  a  substantially  reduced  asset  value,  but  with  outstanding  liabilities  attached.  By 
subsidizing the generator’s transition to low-carbon electricity generation, the Regulator can 
enable  it  to  keep  generating  electricity  while  changing  its  portfolio  to  a  more  socially 
desirable mix and still be able to service the costs of the, now undesirable, assets. Because 
abatement is pursued at lowest cost, the program is efficient and it encourages competitive 
behaviour among firms, but lobbying may make it difficult to subsidize the electricity sector 
to this extent. It should be remembered however, that providing subsidies to generators will 
limit the impact of a Carbon Price on the price of electricity. Irrespective of negotiations over 
the  extent  of  Tier  2  subsidies,  TPAM  offers  a  lowest-cost  mechanism  achieving  greater 23 
 
efficiency than a CT or an ETS. 
2.5  MACs derived from Levelized Energy Cost vs MACs derived in TPAM 
McKinsey&Co have also calculated marginal abatement curves for Australia. Their finding 
was that Australia faces a Long-Run MAC of between $60 and $70 which is the additional 
cost of implementing the low-carbon option compared with the cost of the high-carbon option 
(McKinsey, 2008). This would appear to be substantially lower than the MAC calculated in 
our TPAM model. The primary difference is that McKinsey calculates MAC as the emission 
difference between new technologies rather than the cost of reducing emissions from installed 
technology over a short period of time.   
Table 5: Generator LEC and MAC 
Generator  Fuel 
price 
LEC/MWh  tCO2e/MWh  MAC 
SCPf 
Super Critical Pulverized fuel (Coal)  $1.40/GJ  $44.79  0.8   
IGCC 
Integrated Gasification  $1.40/GJ  $66.60  0.82  No abatement 
USC 
Ultra Super Critical (Coal)  $1.40/GJ  $45.26  0.74  $8 
CCGT  
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine  $5/GJ  $58.08  0.43  $36 
OCGT 
Open Cycle Gas Turbine  $5/GJ  $86.44  0.71  $463 
WIND  
Wind Turbines   $0  $91.78  0  $59 
CSTP 
Concentrated Solar Tower Power  $0  $116.48  0  $90 
Source: (Wagner, 2010)   
In the electricity industry, firms looking to invest in new technology will look to Levelized 
Energy Cost (LEC), the full equivalent costs of electricity generation over different life-spans, 
to assist with technology choice. LECs for the major generator types, and associated carbon 
intensity, are provided in Table 5. 24 
 
Generation that has the lowest LEC is coal’s SCPf which can be used as the benchmark for 
calculating the cost associated with reduced emissions from alternative technologies.  The 
additional cost associated with reduced emissions provides a MAC for that technology.  The 
MAC of CCGT at $36 is within the range of the McKinsey curve that has a coal to gas shift at 
below $50, and the MAC of Wind at $59 is also within the range of the McKinsey curve that 
has on-shore wind at just more than $50. (With a MAC of $90 it is surprising that CSTP was 
not  even  referenced  in  the  McKinsey  abatement  curve).  Figure  5  provides  a  graphical 
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Figure 5: Abatement cost for electricity generation based on LEC 
Turning to the calculation of MAC in TPAM, abatement is calculated as the cost of reducing 
emissions  from  installed  plant  rather  than  the  increase  in  cost  associated  with  reduced 
emissions  from  different  technology  types.  Inherent  in  the  difference  between  the 
calculations,  is  the  reduced  cost  of  financing  since  significant  funding  for  abatement  is 
provided from Carbon Cost not capital raising. Secondly, the cost of abatement is spread over 25 
 
only  10  years,  the  period  of  TPAM.  Thirdly,  TPAM  incorporates  the  cost  of  growth  in 
abatement cost, although it benefits from increased emission reductions from a high-carbon 
installed  base.  Fourth,  although  TPAM  does  not  overtly  include  the  cost  of  fuel  in  its 
calculation of MAC, the effect of fuel costs is included through the Present Value of Future 
Marginal Cost Changes to the cost of the technologies.  
Table 6: MAC calculated in TPAM 











CCGT Only  Replace 65% coal, 2% growth 
(Replace 100% coal) 










WIND Only  Replace 65% coal, 2% growth 
(Replace 100% coal) 










CSTP Only  Replace 65% coal, 2% growth 
(Replace 100% coal) 












Replace 65% coal, 2% growth  
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MAC (TPAM)  
10 years 
The cost of abatement for the emissions abated over the period of TPAM (10 years). Note: 
this includes the capital cost of generation required for growth, but excludes the Present 
Value of Future Marginal Cost Changes. 
MAC  
(Replaced plant lifespan)  
16.5 years 
The cost of abatement for the emissions abated over the remaining life of the plant being 
replaced. 12 years is used as an average of remaining lifespan of principal coal-fired power 
stations in Australia. Note: this includes the capital cost of generation required for growth, 
but excludes the Present Value of Marginal Cost Changes. 
MAC (New plant lifespan) 
 30 years 
The cost of abatement for the emissions abated over the entire life of the new plant. Note: 
this includes the capital cost of generation required for growth, but excludes the Present 
Value of Marginal Cost Changes. 
Whilst the reduced financing costs, adjustment for future private benefits and high abatement 
from the installed base decrease MAC, the short period applied to the abatement cost and the 26 
 
inclusion  of  growth  significantly  increase  MAC.  The  TPAM  model  also  only  includes 
combinations of CCGT, Wind and CSTP rather than the associated costs of SCPf, IGCC and 
USC  which  are  not  used,  simply  because  they  do  not  yield  abatement  when  growth  is 
included in the model. Costs per TPAM are included in Table 6 and show why MAC cost 
included in TPAM appears high as: it is spread over 10 years, applies to replacing 65% of the 
coal-fired generation base and includes growth in generation capacity. If MAC is calculated 
as the cost of abatement over the remaining life of the plant being replaced then it reduces by 
16% to $78 (Combined CSTP/Wind). If MAC is calculated as the cost of abatement over the 
life  of  the  new  plant  being  installed,  then  it  reduces  by  67%  to  $31  from  the  TPAM 
benchmark. Also, MAC decreases across the board when a larger proportion of the coal-fired 
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Figure 6: Comparing MAC calculated using LEC and TPAM 
Figure 6 shows graphically how the TPAM calculated threshold MAC of $93 decreases to 
$31 when the abatement cost is spread over a longer time period. This indicates that applying 
subsidies to lowest cost abatement can make investment in low-carbon energy less costly than 
the $60 to $70 range indicated by McKinsey (McKinsey, 2008). 
Adherence to the McKinsey MAC curves would involve following a sequential process of 27 
 
infra-marginal cost reducing abatement (McKinsey, 2008), which becomes more expensive 
than  following  a  scenario-based  approach  where  firms  and  the  Regulator  can  combine 
abatement opportunities using different levels of technology stretching innovation to reach 
aggressive abatement targets. The ability to apply Carbon Price to a socially-optimal MAC is 
the integral benefit of TPAM. 
2.6  Sensitivity analysis 
The optimised scenario models a number of variables, movements in which will have an 
effect on the Carbon Price and the MAC threshold. Sensitivity to  the  cost of  CSTP, the 
capacity of CSTP, and the size of the Present Value of Future Marginal Cost Changes are 
analysed. 
2.6.1  Sensitivity to the capital cost of Concentrated Solar Tower Power 
With the uncertainty surrounding the costs of CSTP, there is risk that the cost will deviate 
substantially from that used in the model. As can be seen from Table 7, a 20% decrease in the 
cost of CSTP reduces the Carbon Price and the MAC by 24%, whereas a 20% increase in the 
cost of CSTP increases the Carbon Price and the MAC by 24%.  
Table 7: Sensitivity to CSTP cost 













$87 billion  $ 115 billion  $143 billion  $185 billion 
Optimum Carbon 
Price ($/tCO2e) 
$18.24  $24.10  $29.97  $38.77 
Optimum MAC ($)  $70  $93  $116  $150 
If CSTP costs were 50% higher, the Carbon Price would increase to just under $40/tCO2e (a 
60% increase), which is higher than the preferred range for a price on carbon. In the event that 
CSTP costs were more than 20% higher, the Optimised scenario would only be feasible (ie a 
Carbon Price of under $30) if 43% instead of 65% of coal-generation was replaced, or if 20% 28 
 
of CCGT generation was substituted for CSTP generation to reduce the cost of abatement.  
2.6.2  Sensitivity  to  reduced CSTP capacity 
Concentrated Solar Thermal technology has been dogged by claims of low capacity, in the 
order of 24% without storage (IEA et al., 2010) and 34% with storage (EPRI, 2009), whilst 
the assumption in the model is that Solar Tower technology, with molten salt storage, can 
reach at least 60% capacity (Vogel and Kalb, 2010, NREL and Sargent and Lundy LLC 
Consulting Group, 2003).  
Table 8: Sensitivity to CSTP capacity 
SOLAR GENERATION 









Optimum CSTP (MW)  36,712MW  31,206MW  20,803MW  17,831MW 
Optimum Control Cost ($)  $179 billion  $157 billion  $ 115 billion  $103 billion 
Optimum  Carbon  Price 
($/tCO2e) 
$37.63  $32.95  $24.10  $21.58 
Optimum MAC ($)  $145  $127  $93  $83 
 
Solar Tower technology, with molten salt storage, was demonstrated by the US Department of 
Energy in California between 1996 and 1999, a 17MW plant is currently in operation in 
Spain, with larger plant scheduled to start construction in Spain this year (2010). The impact 
of its capacity on the model is substantial, increasing the Carbon Price by 36% if capacity is 
maximized at 40%. For the Carbon Price to remain under $35 there would need to be a 
guarantee that capacity would reach 40%. In the event that CSTP capacity reached only 40% 
and the Carbon Price needed to be below $30, the OPTIMISED scenario would have to be 
adjusted such that 55% instead of 65% of coal-generation was replaced, or 10% of CCGT 
generation was substituted for CSTP generation to reduce the cost of abatement. 29 
 
2.6.3  Sensitivity to reduced Present Value of Future Marginal Cost Changes 
The  Present  Value  of  Future  Marginal  Cost Changes  from  the  introduction  of  renewable 
energy generation is based on a calculation of a weighted average long range generation cost 
(or Reference LEC) for the National Electricity Market of $53.01 after the introduction of a 
Carbon Price of $25
7. The Regulator, the National Electricity Market and the public may be 
more  inclined  to  keep  the  price  of  electricity  down  by  subsidising  renewable  energy 
investment cost over and above the abatement cost.  
Table 9: Sensitivity to PV of MC changes 



















NEM REF LEC 
($/MWh) 
$30.20  $26.41  $53.01  $46.92 
CSTP PV ($/kW)  $ 0  $ 970  $2,666  $1,866 
Wind PV ($/kW)  $ 0  $ 278  $1,033  $723 
CCGT PV ($/kW)  $0  ($1,545)  ($243)  ($170) 
Optimum  MAC 
($) 
$161  $139  $93  $114 
Carbon  Price 
($/tCO2e) 
$41.77  $35.91  $24.10  $29.41 
Abatement  cost 
($) 
$198,843  $170,953  $114,729 m  $139,970 m 
CCGT  introduced 
to  reduce  CP  to 
$25 (%) 
40% 
(reduce CSTP to 20%) 
40% 
(reduce CSTP to 20%) 
n/a  17% 
(reduce CSTP to 43%) 
As can be seen in Table 9, attempting to keep REF LEC at the pre-Carbon Price level will 
increase the Carbon Price to $35.91 (which will have a corresponding increase in generation 
                                                
7 For details on the calculation of NEM weighted average REF LEC, see Appendix 30 
 
costs), a 49% increase on the Optimised scenario.  If the full cost of renewable technologies 
is funded by the Carbon Price, then the Carbon Price increases to $41.77, a 73% increase on 
the  Optimised  scenario.  A  Carbon  Price  of  $41.77  may  well  be  above  a  socially  and 
economically  acceptable  level,  in  which  case  to  keep  the  Carbon  Price  below  $30,  the 
replacement of coal-fired generation could be reduced from 65% to 37%, or 29% of CCGT 
generation could be substituted for CSTP generation with country abatement falling to 12% or 
17% respectively. 
To ensure a Carbon Price below $30/tCO2e, the Optimised scenario is robust to variations of 
up to 20% in the cost and capacity of CSTP and 30% in the Present Value of Future Marginal 
Cost Changes. Where the Carbon Price exceeds a social or economic ceiling, then either a 
reduced  quantity  of  coal-fired  generation  can  be  replaced,  or  CCGT  generation  can  be 
substituted for CSTP generation to reduce the cost of abatement.  
Section 3  Why TPAM is more effective than a CT or an ETS 
3.1  Optimal response in a world of uncertainty 
Weitzman found that neither a price nor a quantity mechanism is an optimal response to 
induce firms to do what is best in an environment of uncertainty. “Asking a firm to bear the 
extra risk  involved  in adopting a  revenue schedule depending  on uncertain variables not 
under  its  control  may  be  infeasible  or  unacceptable”  (Weitzman,  1978,  p685).  (This  is 
backed up by findings from Dixit and Pindyck that investment under uncertainty is subject to 
“hurdles”,  rates  typically  3  to  4  times  the  cost  of  capital,  required  before  investment  is 
commenced  (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).) In fact, Weitzman found the optimal policy response 
to be where the Regulator provides each firm with “a “price term” plus a weighted “quantity 
term”, the weight depending in a well-defined way on specific features of the underlying 31 
 
situation” (Weitzman, 1978, p683) with good policy instituting  “a reward structure which 
automatically  encourages  the  cheap  firm  to  produce  more  and  the  expensive  firm  less” 
(Weitzman, 1978, p685).   
In line with Weitzman’s proposals, TPAM is left in place for an extended period to protect 
and encourage irreversible investment. What is different between Weitzman’s proposals and 
TPAM is that  Weitzman assumes  that marginal benefit will always be  determined at the 
Pigouvian  optimum  price  and  the  quantity  term  must  be  sufficiently  large  to  discourage 
variance from a desired quota. Conversely TPAM sets price subject to a number of constraints 
using  price  and  the  potential  award  of  subsidies  to  direct  firms  to  indicate  their  optimal 
quantity.  The  Weitzman  model  falls  short  of  optimality  because  market  uncertainties  are 
unlikely to  yield the optimum  price
8 and  it  would be complicated  to allocate a  weighted 
quantity term. On the other hand, TPAM reduces uncertainty even further than the Weitzman 
model by increasing the flow of information between the Regulator and polluters. 
The following sub-sections provide evidence of how TPAM, which directs economic activity 
under uncertainty, will be more effective than an ETS or a CT. 
3.1.1  Regulator gains MAC certainty without the cost of revenue transfers 
Like  an  ETS  or  CT,  TPAM  discloses  firms’  abatement  costs.  However,  the  process  for 
disclosure involves a tender to abate, rather than just a revenue-raising license to pollute, or 
tax. Awarding subsidies based on the tenders that deliver the highest abatement, encourages 
competitive behaviour which will lead to truthful disclosure of firms’ MACs. If firms fail to 
tender their full abatement potential so that they do not offer their lowest MACs or highest 
abatement to the Regulator, they may not win free permits to pollute, or Tier 2 abatement 
subsidies, triggering multiple problems: 
                                                
8Eg, the EU ETS and the RECLAIM market  32 
 
a)  If  their  competitors  tender  their  full  abatement  potential  and  gain  the  benefit  of 
subsidies  for expenditure in new technology, their competitors will gain first mover 
advantage (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) over them; 
b)  Their long-run marginal cost of production will be increased by the cost of carbon, 
ensuring an increased price to consumers with a reduced or no long-run low-carbon 
benefit giving the substitution benefit to their competitors; 
c)  Failing to minimize their production costs by winning free permit subsidies will cause 
shareholder dissatisfaction and possibly lead to share price deterioration
9.  
It is therefore in the profit-maximizing interests of every firm to tender its most aggressive 
abatement  achievable  at  the  Carbon  Price  provided  by  the  Regulator  and  at  a  variety  of 
scenarios that disclose MACs.  The inherent multiple-incentive (to gain a Tier 1 subsidy to 
invest or pay for emissions, or gain a Tier 2 subsidy) included in this tender process will 
provide a reliable mechanism (barring extreme strategic behaviour by firms) for the Regulator 
to understand each firm’s MACs, and ensure expenditure on abatement to the most cost-
effective  abaters  without  the  requirement  for  firms  to  transfer  funds  to  government  by 
acquiring rights (or paying a tax) to pollute. Eliminating the costs associated with transferring 
MAC information, makes TPAM more efficient than an ETS or a CT.  
3.1.2  Cost of investment reduced 
With an ETS or a CT each firm assesses its MAC and compares that to the Carbon Price. 
Where an electricity generator sees its MAC as $90 and compares that to a Carbon Price of 
$25, it will pursue no abatement. Where Carbon Price is too low to incentivise any abatement, 
each firm will still bear the Carbon Cost and will seek to pass that cost on to consumers, so 
society  will  bear  the  cost  associated  with  a  $25  Carbon  Price  but  with  no  or  little 
                                                
9There is evidence that share price is influenced by awareness of a company’s environmental responsibility and 
innovation. ENGARDIO, P. & ARNDT, M. (2007) What Price Reputation? BusinessWeek, 70-79.  33 
 
environmental benefit. If TPAM is in place, each firm will disclose its MACs to the Regulator 
and the firms with lowest MACs will be incentivised to abate. Allowing firms to transfer their 
Carbon Cost to abatement expenditure eliminates investment inertia associated with uncertain 
market activity. Firms will pay to abate or for someone else to abate on their behalf (where 
they pay the price, the Regulator will be abating on their behalf). Most importantly, TPAM 
provides substantial upfront funding to make assets more carbon efficient. 
Whilst an ETS purports to equalize MACs over the long-run, it requires a computation of 
MAC based on future unknown technologies and costs which does not provide a reliable 
decision  signal.  Instability  of  MAC  values,  due  to  path  dependence  and  technological 
breakthroughs (Morris et al., 2008), invalidates the theory that an ETS can allocate funds to 
abatement efficiently over the long-run. McKinsey, too, points to the risk of increasing the 
cost of abatement by spending on lowest capital intensity rather than lowest abatement cost 
due to rapid capital pay-back requirements(McKinsey, 2009).  
Using  MAC  certainty  gained  through  TPAM,  the  Regulator  is  able  to  direct  abatement 
efficiently. Also, increased use of new technologies will lead to ‘learning-by-doing’ benefits 
that will reduce costs further (Jaffe et al., 2005). Subsidies that recognize the social benefit of 
abatement are more reliable for  cost-effective resource allocation than a single, uncertain 
permit price based on the market perception of private costs and benefits. 
3.1.3  Reduced risk reduces firms’ cost 
Unlike an ETS, TPAM involves little cost uncertainty for firms. Understanding the extent of 
the Carbon Cost eliminates the need for pricing the risk of price variations into cost structures, 
thus reducing pass through to customers. Having to tender MACs to the Regulator would 
ensure that firms have a good understanding of their abatement costs. Firms look to gain 
certainty of costs through long-term contracts and TPAM does this. TPAM also allows inter-
temporal smoothing of abatement. If firms believe that abatement costs will increase in the 34 
 
long-run, then those firms/industries that do not gain subsidies in the first fixed period, will 
seek to offer effective abatement in the second fixed period, because of the expected increase 
in Carbon Cost and/or the advancement of technology. So assistance will be provided to them 
when it is most cost-effective for them to spend on abatement. Fixing the Carbon Costs for a 
defined period is preferable to an ETS as it can provide firms, policy-makers and politicians 
with cost certainty to pursue contractually agreed environmental actions at lowest-cost. 
3.2  Environmental  outcomes  improved  by  pursuing  a  ‘Robin  Hood’ 
approach  
Unlike an ETS or a CT, TPAM will only raise revenue if abatement can be offered more cost-
effectively by, or through, a Regulator. A policy of taxing ‘bads’ to give to ‘goods’, a “Robin 
Hood”  approach,  uses  revenues  raised through  the  income  effect  to  fund  the  substitution 
effect,  thereby  closely  targeting  the  externality  (Helm,  2005).  So  Carbon  Cost  is  applied 
consistently across firms and all funds are spent on cost-effective abatement
10.    
As noted by the Australian  Academy of Science, technologies that  would be  optimal  for 
addressing Australia’s base-load power requirements, do not currently appear in Australia’s 
energy mix because they are above the expected carbon price threshold(Australian Academy 
of  Science,  2010).  TPAM,  however,  would  uncouple  environmental  outcomes  from  the 
relationship between MAC and Carbon Price, which is significant because climate change and 
environmental  deterioration  may  not  respond  to  action  at  the  margins  (Helm,  2005). 
Application of costs to abatement may be lumpy, (i.e., applied in 10 year spurts rather than on 
a hypothetically smooth MAC curve
11) and in the future it may be found to have been more 
expensive to have acted before the mythical backstop technology appeared, but the backstop 
                                                
10 Only a percentage of the revenue raised by the Regulator may be subject to inefficiencies. 
11 Investment in abatement should by its very nature be lumpy and dependent on installed stock and available 
technology. Waiting for the perfect technology ignores the precautionary principle.   35 
 
technology is reliant on investment, not equating MAC to Carbon Price.  
As depicted in Figure 7, TPAM can direct abatement expenditure to all of the Brown Coal 
Generator’s scenarios rather than abatement being reliant on the private benefit that results 
from a relationship between MAC and Carbon Price.  
 
Figure 7: Generator Marginal Abatement Cost Curve 
3.3  Comparing TPAM to other mechanisms 
3.3.1  TPAM vs Free permit allocation 
The evidence from both EU ETS and the US SOx program is that free permit allocation does 
not drive significant investment in new technology. Whilst the US SOx program encouraged 
infra-marginal  cost-reducing  technology  switching  between  inputs  and  available 
technologies,  it  did  not  deliver  technology  stretching  innovations(Carlson  et  al.,  2000). 
Providing permits free to polluters, fosters a business-as-usual approach rather than a focus on 
substantial abatement (Neuhoff, 2008). A system that awards subsidies based on historical 36 
 
pollution  protects  current  asset  value  without  incenting  socially  optimal  abatement.  The 
subsidies provided by TPAM, however, will be focused on lowest-cost abatement rather than 
protecting high-emitting assets. 
3.3.2  TPAM vs an energy tax  
Because the major source of carbon emissions is from energy, the UK Climate Change Levy 
(CCL) was introduced in the UK to tax energy to foster abatement and encourage energy 
efficiency,  with  the  revenue  raised  returned  to  firms  as  reduced  National  Insurance 
contributions. To reduce competitive pressures on emissions-intensive trade-exposed firms, 
Climate  Change  Agreements  (CCA)  were  introduced  as  complementary  measures  to 
incentivise firms to reduce energy usage by offering substantial discounts in CCL liability. In 
addition, a combination of interest-free loans and enhanced capital allowances were made 
available  to  firms  to  increase  their  expenditure  on  abatement  (House  of  Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee, 2008). 
There are a few key differences between CCL and TPAM. Firstly CCL raises revenue which 
it then applies to reducing other taxes which doesn’t incentivise action on abatement.  As 
noted by the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2008, applying a carbon 
price (in the form of the CCL and an Emissions Trading Scheme) was not effective in driving 
innovation because additional stimuli were needed (House of Commons Environmental Audit 
Committee, 2008).  Secondly, applying the revenue raised to reducing other taxes benefited 
firms other than those engaging in abatement which reduced behaviour change. Finally, only 
limited funds were applied to interest-free loans and the enhanced capital allowances program 
to  incentivise  firms  to  invest  in  the  “step-changes  in  technology”  (House  of  Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee, 2008, p24) required to move to low-carbon production. 
The similarity between CCL and TPAM is in the use of CCAs which would be similar in 
nature  to  the  tenders  submitted  in  TPAM  with  substantial  reduction  in  liability  for  a 37 
 
successful  contractual  agreement.  It  is  therefore  interesting  to  note  that  the  CCAs  were 
regarded as successful in inducing behavioural change because of the focus on concrete action 
to stimulate change and the extra financial incentive of claiming a tax discount (House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2008).  
However, the effectiveness of the program was limited to efficiency measures rather than 
absolute emissions savings due to the lack of real incentives for firms to spend on abatement. 
Dr Ian Bailey from University of Plymouth stated:  
“The greater issue is the affordability of that technology and the various either 
internal financing requirements or the need to go out on to open capital markets 
and persuade other investment organizations to invest in things which have got a 
very  long  pay  back  lead-time”.  (House  of  Commons  Environmental  Audit 
Committee, 2008, p25)   
He drew the conclusion that more public funding should be made available for firms to spend 
on abatement technology. Dr Bailey also suggested that “what happens with the revenue from 
the  Climate  Change  Levy  could  be  as  important  as  the  price  incentive  itself”  (House  of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2008, p35).  
The findings on the UK’s CCL, that firms require substantial incentives in the form of long-
term agreements and public funding to embark on abatement, provides evidence that TPAM 
will be a superior mechanism for abatement. Applying the terminology of Andrew Warren, 
who provided evidence to the House of Commons Audit committee, TPAM will provide an 
integrated policy approach to abatement, combining ‘carrots’ (subsidies to abate), ‘sticks’ 
(payment of Carbon Cost if insufficient abatement offered) and ‘tambourines’ (competitive 
tender process to offer efficient abatement) to achieve desired environmental outcomes. 
3.4   Evidence  from the literature  that  combined  tax-subsidy  programs  are 
efficient and effective 
Having established that TPAM will be more effective than an ETS (both fully auctioned and 38 
 
free permit allocation), hybrid models and a revenue-neutral tax like the UK’s CCL, it is 
important  to  establish  what  theoretical  evidence  exists  to  provide  further  support  for  a 
mechanism  which  encourages  the  use  of  charges  combined  with  subsidies  for  socially-
beneficial behaviour. 
A study of US paper mills found that a 10% increase in emissions abatement capital delivered 
6.9%  lower  emissions  which  translated  into  a  75%  return  on  investment  for  society 
(Shadbegian and Gray, 2003)
12.  This is a significant finding in that it provides a substantial 
incentive for society to provide subsidies to firms that spend on efficient abatement.  
However,  it  has  been  proposed  that  subsidies  to  firms  for  abatement  actually  lead  to  an 
increase in emissions, as additional profits attract new entrants into the market leading to 
greater industry emissions (Baumol and Oates, 1988, Kohn, 1992). The subsidy offered as 
free permits through TPAM is based on abatement and therefore does not attract new entrants 
on the basis of increased profits. A Tier 2 subsidy that induces a new entrant will only be 
offered based on no or very low emissions, so it will not increase emissions. In addition, the 
introduction of a Carbon Price will ensure a uniform increase in marginal cost. Both firms 
engaging in abatement expenditure or choosing to pay the Carbon Price can increase their 
price because of the opportunity cost of the Carbon Price. The only differentiation between 
firms/industries will be the emission-intensity of their operations. Those that have the higher 
emission-intensity will have a larger increase in marginal costs and therefore price, triggering 
the desired income and substitution effects.  
What about new entrants? They will face the same marginal Carbon Cost as their competitors 
which will provide a disincentive to new entrants that have a high-carbon production process. 
                                                
12 The large benefits are directly connected to the large estimated mortality impacts of particulates. Benefits will 
be different in the case of reducing GHG emissions, although reducing the potential for stochastic events which 
dramatically reduce quality and quantity of life may well provide benefits as large as the Shadbegian and Gray 
study. 39 
 
Carbon Cost will only incentivise entrants that have a low-carbon production process, which 
leads to socially efficient production. 
What about those firms exiting from the market as they are unable to achieve cost-effective 
abatement and unable to operate profitably when Carbon Costs have to be met? In line with 
socially efficient production, carbon intensive firms that cannot be profitable when carbon has 
a value need to exit the market. These exiting firms need to be offered the equivalent of free 
permits because, by definition, they are abating, although the quantum of subsidy would have 
to depend on agreed termination timeframes.  
A system of a combined tax and subsidy was found to be efficient for controlling households’ 
automobile emissions because “any combination of the tax on emissions and the subsidy for 
emissions abated that sums to marginal pollution damage is economically efficient” (Kohn, 
1996  P459).      Where  we  don’t  know  the  marginal  pollution  damage,  if  the  tax-subsidy 
combination  delivers  the  required  pollution  reduction  at  lowest  cost,  then  efficiency  is 
achieved. Also Conrad, in an analysis of power plants’ investment in technology to abate SOx 
emissions,  found  that  a  combined  subsidy  and  tax  system  can  solve  market  failure  by 
directing the decision variables of the firm toward the socially optimum abatement investment 
(Conrad, 1991).  
There is substantial evidence of the efficiency of tax-subsidy programs in water pollution 
control  implementations.  Because  of  uncertainty  about  the  marginal  social  damage  of 
pollution and politically induced budget constraints, pollution charges are often implemented 
below their optimal Pigouvian level. It was found in France that in addition to a pollution 
charge,  a  system  of  contracts  with  efficient  polluters  who  offered  information  about 
abatement in return for compensation for abatement, ensured investment in abatement to the 
socially optimal level (Thomas, 1995). Similarly, Xepapadeas found that ‘budget-balancing’ 
contracts involving fines or subsidies was efficient, inducing individual polluters to follow 40 
 
optimal  environmental  activities  (Xepapadeas,  1991).  Empirical  evidence  on  abatement 
expenditure by Chinese industrial firms also shows that a system of charges, most of which 
fund subsidies, has been effective in incentivising industrial water pollution abatement (Wang 
and Chen, 1999).  
It  can  be  assumed  that  uncertainty  about  the  marginal  social  damage  of  pollution  will 
encourage a sub-optimal setting of a carbon price under a CT, ETS or TPAM.  However, 
TPAM  accommodates  a  sub-optimal  setting  of  Carbon  Price  because  it  funds  efficient 
abatement  when  Carbon  Price  is  well  below  MAC.  This  makes  TPAM  an  efficient 
mechanism, as Fischer has found that welfare gains from support for innovation can be high 
when the carbon price has not been set at an optimal Pigouvian level (Fischer, 2008). 
3.5  What are the possible shortcomings of TPAM? 
3.5.1  Strategic behaviour by firms 
Firms will seek to maximize subsidies and minimize expenditure through strategic behaviour. 
For this reason it is important to follow a competitive tender process to ensure that firms are 
not aware of thresholds. Firms must compete with each other to win subsidies rather than 
submit tenders that will guarantee the award of subsidies. A further reason for withholding 
threshold  information  is  to  avoid  misleading  firms.    In  the  worked  example  above,  the 
Regulator’s threshold abatement level for the country is 20%. However, if a benchmark were 
applied to the electricity industry, the abatement benchmark would be 57%. The defining 
variable  that  establishes  whether  a  firm  reaches  the  threshold  required  is  the  MAC,  not 
abatement percentage.   
There are good reasons for also withholding the threshold MAC.  Recall that TPAM requires 
a variety of information to be returned to the Regulator to establish where abatement funds 
should best be applied. Announcement of a MAC will encourage strategic behaviour by firms 41 
 
to tender abatement to the threshold rather than disclose their lowest MACs.  
There have been a few studies that have suggested the use of subsidies to reduce strategic 
behaviour.  (Kwerel, 1977) suggested returning subsidies for unused permits once limited 
permits  had  been  allocated  to  emitters.    Dasgupta,  Hammond  and  Masking  proposed  a 
Vickery-Clarke-Groves  (VCG)  auction  mechanism  to  get  firms  to  disclose  their  permit 
demand schedules with a 2-part payment structure. Montero proposed a uniform price auction 
with part of the auction revenues returned to firms as incentives to bid truthfully(Montero, 
2008).  Despite the benefits of improving ‘truth-telling’ by firms, these mechanisms remain 
auction mechanisms which: transfer revenue to government; introduce additional abatement 
cost due to lack of price certainty; and duplicate firms’ costs because of the requirement to 
purchase permits for unabated emissions irrespective of the quantum invested in abatement.  
Experimental economics has produced some interesting findings in the area of fixed price plus 
rationing mechanisms. TPAM is similar to non-price rationing of buyers, like initial public 
offerings, where the seller sets the price at which excess demand is expected in order to 
reward information revelation with preferential treatment. Papers that have explicitly analysed 
incentives in market games that involve rationing of buyers find that these mechanisms are 
often desirable to the seller and outperform mechanisms like uniform price auctions (Grimm 
et  al.,  2008).  Grimm  found  that  when  demand  is  uncertain,  bidders  will  overstate  their 
demand to avoid being rationed (Grimm et al., 2008), which would suggest that firms will be 
highly incentivised to abate and disclose their true MACs to avoid missing out on subsidies.  
3.5.2  Sub-Optimising the threshold MAC 
There is risk that the Regulator may make a mistake in its Control Cost calculation. If the 
threshold MAC is calculated to be (incorrectly) very low, then all abatement will fall to the 
Regulator which will result in higher than lowest-cost abatement. If the threshold MAC is 
calculated to be (incorrectly) very high, it will allow abatement by firms where it could have 42 
 
been carried out at less cost by the Regulator.  Calculating the Control Cost requires good 
information on abatement costs. To limit the potential for mistakes Regulators should consult 
widely and require technology providers to guarantee prices and performance
13. 
The use of a ‘benchmark’ in TPAM does not introduce inefficient compliance costs for firms 
(other than establishing their MACs) because subsidies and abatement are not subject to the 
implementation of any one technology. In support of the concept of a benchmark, there have 
been  suggestions  that  the  introduction  of  best-available  technology  benchmarks  would 
maximize the internal effectiveness and efficiency of the EU ETS (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006). 
There  was  also  no  evidence  that  the  US  SOx  program  was  more  successful  than  the 
implementation of a uniform performance standard (Carlson et al., 2000).  These analyses 
would suggest that the use of a threshold MAC in TPAM would optimise abatement.  
Furthermore, TPAM includes a safety net because the Regulator is able to access all firms’ 
MACs. This allows the Regulator, where appropriate, to cut-off the award of subsidies once a 
desired abatement level is reached.  By comparison, the market process has no safety net and 
as a result, markets, too, can make inefficient allocations as was evidenced in the EU ETS and 
the Reclaim NOx auction market.  The existence of a benchmark, safety net and cost benefits 
make TPAM a desirable mechanism. 
3.5.3  Risk of ‘picking losers’ 
Awarding subsidies risks the tender process being labelled as ‘Government picking winners’ 
and substantial government involvement in the process of market-based incentives may be 
perceived as inefficient. However, the Regulator should be set up as an independent body, like 
                                                
13 Aggressive SOx emission reductions were achieved in Germany between 1983 and 1993 where electricity 
generators were given emission reduction targets based on guaranteed performance by technology providers. 
WATZOLD, F. (2004) SO2 Emissions in Germany: Regulations to Fight Waldsterben. IN HARRINGTON, W. 
& MORGENSTERN, R. D. (Eds.) Choosing environmental policy : comparing instruments and outcomes in the 
United States and Europe. Washington, DC :, Resources for the Future. 43 
 
the Reserve Bank, which, in effect, is managing a market mechanism that encompasses the 
demand for and supply of resources that are primarily of social, rather than private, value, at 
least in the short term.  Whilst the establishment of an independent Regulator may appear to 
be considerable regulatory manipulation, it is no more than an ETS which involves regulatory 
manipulation to create and sustain permit markets by defining initial property rights, rules for 
allocation, enforcement, and then oversight to ensure competitive behaviour (Helm, 2005).   
Even though the Regulator would be awarding subsidies, the winners would be determined by 
competitive behaviour and environmental benefit, not the Regulator. 
3.5.4  Failure to achieve abatement 
Where firms do not deliver abatement offered in the tenders, it is a simple matter to calculate 
the value of the shortfall and to demand the ex post payment of Carbon Prices. This would be 
written into contracts. Whether penalties should also be involved and their magnitude, in 
extreme cases, is an open question. 
3.5.5  International limitations 
Whilst TPAM is compliant with reaching international treaty obligations in that it is based 
around  a  quantity  target  which  is  set  by  the  Regulator,  it  does  not  fit  easily  into  an 
international  carbon  market  mechanism.  This  does  not  preclude  international  abatement 
activity. Where the Regulator decides on a very low Carbon Price, the most cost-effective 
way of meeting abatement objectives may well be to base the control cost of abatement on the 
purchase of international abatement opportunities, which the Regulator may take up where 
abatement opportunities within the country are not affordable. 
It is suggested that the benefits of keeping funds within the country would tend to outweigh 
the benefits of diverting funds offshore, as national firms will gain competitive advantages 
over international competitors if abatement funds are invested locally. However, this is a 
debate  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  In  terms  of  participating  in  international  carbon 44 
 
markets, the proposal that TPAM is superior to an ETS predisposes the view that participation 
in  an  international  carbon  market  will  deliver  inferior  outcomes,  and  therefore  is  not 
particularly desirable. 
3.5.6  Including forestry and land use change 
There is no reason why foresters and land-owners should not tender their abatement proposals 
to the Regulator to gain subsidies which will serve as payment for their carbon sequestration. 
The  problem  lies  in  the  reality  that  they  are  small  firms  without  the  resources  to  be 
individually  involved  in  submissions  to  the  Regulator.  The  Regulator,  too,  would  not  be 
interested in high volumes of low abatement tenders which would drive up transaction costs.  
However, it would be effective for land-owners to form syndicates which would be large 
enough  to  tender  joint  submissions  and  gain  joint  subsidies,  thereby  avoiding  the 
inefficiencies  of  many  small  transactions.  Forestry  and  land-use  offsets  have  historically 
attracted relatively low offset value, so a fixed carbon price could have substantial benefits for 
these sectors.  
Section 4  Conclusion 
Following Weitzman (Weitzman, 1978), Okun (Okun, 1981) and Stiglitz (Stiglitz, 2002), it is 
clear that, in the face of the uncertainty, i.e. poor quality information that characterises the 
nature, extent and speed of global warming and the link with greenhouse gases, it is unwise to 
try to reduce carbon dioxide emissions using either a simple ‘cap and trade’ or carbon tax 
strategy.  What  is  required  is  a  hybrid  price  and  quantity  mechanism  that  reduces  the 
uncertainty  for  both  a  regulator  and  firms.  The  Tender-Price  Allocation  Mechanism 
introduced  here  attempts  to  provide  an  appropriate  scheme.  The  Regulator,  acting  as  the 
caretaker of the environmental resource, provides information to the market in the form of a 45 
 
Carbon Price. At this price, firms provide information back to the Regulator in the form of a 
tender to deliver abatement in return for subsidies. The information provided through the 
tender process ensures the efficient use of funds to deliver cost-effective abatement. For the 
ability to charge for pollution and reward for abatement, the Regulator becomes a 'visible 
hand’ using information from firms to direct the optimum use of society’s resources. Rather 
than standing aside to let a market dictate prices subject to an aggregation of private interests, 
the Regulator engages in the market process by bargaining with firms to supply cost-effective 
abatement  using  built-in  incentives  to  solve  investment  and  technological  externalities 
without resorting to prizes, tax breaks, (Montgomery and Smith, 2005, Jaffe et al., 2005), 
Renewable Energy Targets/Certificates or Feed-in Tariffs.  
We have argued that the Tender-Price Allocation Mechanism is superior to both emissions 
trading and carbon taxation. It reduces the costs of abatement for firms and increases cost-
effective investment in abatement through the award of subsidies, not by Government but 
through the competitive actions of firms. Whereas Green found that permit price volatility 
directed investment away from renewable energy (Green, 2008), the findings here are that 
price stability and increased information allow increased abatement from the cheapest abaters. 
It  also  becomes  possible  to  have  investment  in  what  is  now  high  cost  CSTP  and  Wind 
electricity  generation  rather  than  cheaper  CCGT  electricity  generation.  TPAM  facilitates 
transition to a low-carbon economy but also garners investment for the technologies that will 
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Appendix: Calculations, assumptions and sources of information 
New Generation alternatives 
Only 3 alternatives are considered for new generation to reduce the complexity of the model.  
Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) is chosen as an alternative to coal as interim base-
load  generation  for  reduced  emissions  and  ease  of  start-up/shutdown  to  compensate  for 
possible renewable energy intermittency. Concentrated Solar Tower Power (CSTP) is chosen 
for already-available, renewable, zero-emission generation which allows for power generation 
to  meet  peak  load  requirements,  with  the  ability  to  replace  base-load  fossil-fuel  power 
generation (Arvizu, 2008, Australian Academy of Science, 2010). Wind power is chosen as a 
cheaper renewable energy option although its base-load power generation potential is limited. 
Geothermal and Carbon Capture and Storage are not included because they are technologies 
that are not yet proven or available for commercial roll-out. Technologies based on coal are 
not included because their abatement potential is insufficient to compensate for the increase in 
emissions from growth.  
COSTS AND SOURCES OF CAPITAL COSTS USED IN TPAM ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
CCGT: $1,273,000  (ACIL Tasman, 2009) 
WIND POWER: $2,134,000/MW ((McLennan Magasanik Associates, 2008, Hearps 
and Wright, 2010) with 30% capacity (Hearps and Wright, 2010) 
CSTP: $6,713,000/MW (Vogel and Kalb, 2010).  US$ 5.7 million/MW for Tower 
technology  with  solar multiple  of 4.4, and 16 hours of storage according to  Kolb 
(SANDIA) analysis of Spain ‘advanced receiver’ installation (Vogel and Kalb, 2010). 50 
 
With the potential to deliver energy during peak load times, Concentrated Solar Tower  
Power  (with  storage),  can  provide  base-load  power  from  renewable  sources 
(SolarPaces, 2010). Studies point to the ability of CSTP to reach 73% capacity from 
Concentrated Solar Tower technology if sufficient heliostats are installed (NREL and 
Sargent and Lundy LLC Consulting Group, 2003).However, there is a widely-held 
view that CSTP is too expensive to implement, with the SolarTres installation in Spain 
at a cost of Euro 10 million/MW(Viebahn et al., 2008) often cited as evidence. It 
should  be  remembered  that  the  SolarTres  installation  is  the  first  commercial 
installation and as heliostats make up more than 50% of the cost of the plant(Kolb et 
al., 2007), it is expected that increased production and technology improvements will 
reduce the cost of heliostats alone from more than US$250/m
2 (SolarPaces, 2010) to 
less than US$100/m
2 if 9GW of CSTP is implemented globally (Kolb et al., 2007).  
With  10GW  of  concentrating  solar  power  projects  under  development  in  the  US 
(SEIA, 2010), it is likely that 9GW of CSTP will be installed over the next few years, 
thereby triggering the cost decrease in heliostats. This should provide justification for 
the  suitability  of  using  the  NREL  Sargent  and  Lundy  (S&L)  prediction  of 
US$3.6m/MW by 2020.   
We are, however, reluctant to use the lowest cost option despite evidence that it is 
realistic. Therefore, we have chosen a much more conservative estimation of capital 
cost for CSTP, based on the  “Kolb (SANDIA) advanced  receiver  Spain”  scenario 
(Vogel and Kalb, 2010), using a solar multiple of 4.4 rather than 2.9, and a heliostat 
cost of $138/m
2 (current cost is estimated to be $164/m
2 (Kolb et al., 2007)) rather 
than $96/m
2, included in the S&L analysis. We have also assumed the capacity of 
CSTP to be 60% instead of the S&L, Kolb, Vogel/Kalb predictions of more than 70%. 
The  Kolb  scenario  predicts  a  total  capital  cost  of  US$5,706/MW  for  large  CSTP 
installations which we have converted at a rate of US$0.85 to the Australian dollar. 51 
 
ADJUSTMENT TO CAPITAL COST USED IN TPAM: CALCULATING THE PRESENT VALUE OF 
FUTURE MARGINAL COST CHANGES FROM ABATEMENT 
Investing  in  renewable  energy  delivers  a  double  benefit,  namely  abatement  as  well  as 
decreased  fuel  costs.  Abatement  provides  a  social  benefit,  whilst  decreased  Short  Run 
Marginal Cost (SRMC) delivers a private benefit.  For illustration, consider the investment in 
CSTP for abatement. CSTP has a high capital cost and a low SRMC. However, with TPAM 
the funds for the investment in CSTP are applied from Carbon Cost, and should be excluded 
from the calculation of Levelized Energy Cost (LEC). Therefore applying all of the CSTP 
investment to abatement delivers substantial future period private benefits to generators.  
The Present Value of Future Marginal Cost Changes (PVFMCC) is the capital sum required 
to  increase  the  LEC  of  CSTP  to  a  Reference  LEC.  The  Reference  LEC  used  here  is  a 
weighted average of Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) after the introduction of a 
Carbon  Price  of  $25.  For  details  of  this  calculation,  see  the  NEM  Weighted  Average 
Calculations below. 
To ensure that a subsidy within a subsidy is not provided to energy abaters, the PVFMCC 
from CSTP, Wind Power and CCGT are calculated with reference to a weighted average LEC  
for the NEM after the implementation of a carbon price. This yields the following results: 












PV of LEC 
diff ($/kW) 
CSTP  $6,713  $116.48  $11.20  $53.01  $2,666 
WIND  $2,134  $91.78  $16.60  $53.01  $1,033 
CCGT 
(gas  price =  $5/GJ, 
Carbon Price = $25) 
$1,273  $70.50  $55.74  $53.01  ($243) 52 
 
Therefore, to calculate the true cost of abatement, $2,666/kW which represents the private 
benefit of switching to CSTP, needs to be subtracted from the investment cost of $6,713, such 
that the abatement cost becomes $4,047.  The benefit of setting the Reference LEC at the 
average  NEM  LEC  is  that  electricity  price  increases  will  be  stabilised,  especially  if 
meaningful quantities of renewable energy are implemented. Equally, the abatement cost of 
Wind  Power  reduces  from  $2,134/kW  to  $1,101/kW  but  the  abatement  cost  of  CCGT 
increases by $243/kW to $1,516/kW to reflect the increases in generation costs that will result 
from implementation of CCGT technology. 
NEM WEIGHTED  AVERAGE  CALCULATIONS  OF:  GWH  GENERATED,  REF  LEC’S,  CAPACITY 
FACTOR AND EMISSION INTENSITY 
Data from ACIL Tasman’s “Fuel Resource, new entry and generation costs in the NEM” 
(2009) is used extensively to calculate NEM averages.   
•  GWhs generated is  calculated  based on  plants’  registered capacity, with  estimated 
capacity balanced to ESAA's Electricity Gas Australia 2009 Table 2.6 which gives 
generation by fuel by state. Capacity of each plant is estimated at the state average to 
deliver generation according to state fuel type. 
•  Cost of Generation for each plant is calculated using SRMC plus Fixed O&M costs for 
each plant multiplied by estimated generation.  
•  ‘REF LEC’ is calculated as the Cost of Generation divided by estimated generation; it 
excludes  any  financing  costs  of  generation.  This  provides  a  reference  cost  of 
generation that can be used for comparison to renewable generation technologies.  
•  Weighted average emissions intensity is calculated using emissions intensity of each 
plant multiplied by GWhs generated, summed and averaged. 53 
 
•  Weighted average capacity is calculated using each plant’s estimated capacity as a 
proportion of total capacity, summed and averaged. 

























CCGT  3519  $202  57.58   $247  70.16   0.50   16% 
CCGT/Cogen  91  $8  87.53   $9  101.90   0.58   6% 
Cogen  167  $10  61.50   $13  76.51   0.60   12% 
Cogen/CCGT  519  $26  49.21   $33  64.19   0.60   33% 
Engines  6  $3  532.83   $3  558.17   1.01   1% 
OCGT  7180  $725  101.00   $869  120.98   0.80   14% 
Steam turbine  182045  $4,136  22.72   $9,084  49.90   1.09   70% 
Coal (Black)  122016  $2,989  24.49   $6,002  49.19   0.99   68% 
NSW  71765  $1,828  25.47   $3,656  50.95   1.02   70% 
QLD  50251  $1,161  23.11   $2,346  46.68   0.94   65% 
Coal (Brown)  55294  $814  14.71   $2,652  47.97   1.33   86% 
Natural gas  4735  $334  70.49   $430  90.83   0.81   27% 
Grand Total  193527  $5,111  26.41   $10,259  53.01   1.06   57% 
Source: ACIL Tasman 2009, ESAA 2009 
 
Calculating Emissions  
CALCULATION OF EMISSIONS FROM CURRENT GENERATING BASE: 
•  Establish Capacity Utilization, ie the amount of GWh produced as a percentage of the 
total maximum capacity. For instance: 
o  Total GWh capacity in 2007/08 was 424,466GWh which is a calculated figure 
from the total connected (excludes non-hydro renewable) generation available 
in 2007/08 of 48,455MW(ABARE, 2010) multiplied by total hours available 
(24*365) = 8760. 
o   Total GWh produced from connected generation in 2007/08 was 228,600, of 
which coal generation was 80.8%, Natural gas was 13.2%, Hydro was 5.2% 54 
 
and Other was 0.8%(ESAA, 2009) . 
o  Capacity  utilization  is  GWh  produced  divided  by  GWh  capacity,  which 
produced these results in 2007/08: coal/diesel  69%, gas  37% and hydro 17%. 
•  Establish Emission Intensity of fuel ie the amount of tCO2e emitted in the process of 
generating electricity 
o  tCO2e emissions in the production of public electricity (Department of Climate 
Change, 2008).  
￿  Fossil Fuel Solid(Coal) = 181.3MtCO2e 
￿  Fossil Fuel Gaseous = 20.5 MtCO2e 
￿  Fossil Fuel Liquid(Oil) = 2.4MtCO2e 
o  Per GWh of electricity produced  
￿  Coal = 184,709GWh 
￿  Gas = 30,175GWh 
￿  Oil =  1,829GWh 
o  Emissions  from  generation:  is  tCO2e  divided  by  GWh  produced,  which 
produced  these  results  in  2007/08:  coal  0.98;  gas  0.68;  and  diesel  1.0 
tCO2e/GWh. 
•  Emissions from installed generation is calculated as follows: 
o  MW  x Total  hours  available x capacity utilization x emissions intensity  of 
generation 
o  Coal: 8760 x 0.72 x 0.98 = 6181 tCO2e/MW 
o  Gas: 8760 x 0.34 x 0.68 = 2025 tCO2e/MW 
CALCULATION OF EMISSIONS FROM NEW GENERATION: 
When  replacing  base-load  coal-fired  generators  with  CCGT  or  CSTP  generators,  the 
following need to be taken into account: 
•  Capacity utilization 55 
 
o  Capacity utilization for CCGT is calculated to be 85%, to provide base-load 
generation. 
o  Capacity utilization for CSTP is calculated to be 60%. (see Notes on New 
Generation alternatives) 
o  Capacity utilization for Wind is calculated to be 30%. 
o  Coal-fired generation historically has operated at 72% of capacity but when 
combined with Diesel, the capacity becomes 69%. When replacing Coal/Diesel 
with  CCGT  or  CSTP  which  have  85%  and  60%  capacity  respectively,  a 
different quantum of generation needs to be built to allow for the change in 
capacity through the loss of coal generation. Therefore, if Coal is replaced by 
CSTP, then the MW required is calculated as follows: 
 
•  Emissions from generation:  
o  CCGT: 0.43tCO2e per MWh, equivalent to the average emission intensity for 
new entrant technologies for Queensland, NSW and Victoria (ACIL Tasman, 
2009) 
o  CSTP: 0 
o  WIND: 0 
•  Emissions from new generation is calculated as follows: 
o  CCGT: MW x 8760 x 0.85 x 0.43 = 3202 tCO2e/MW 
o  CSTP: MW x 0 = 0 tCO2e/MW 
o  WIND: MW x 0 = 0 tCO2e/MW 
Projected Carbon Dioxide Emissions for Australia 
Australian emissions of CO2e as at 2008 were 576MtCO2e(Department of Climate Change, 56 
 
2008). Following historic trends from 1990 to 2007, of: 
•  2.1%  increase per annum in emissions from energy 
•  1% increase per annum in emissions from industrial 
•  0.1% increase per annum in emissions from agriculture 
These percentages are used to project emissions to 2011, the start year of TPAM. However, in 
the  following  areas  historic  emissions  don’t  show  a  reliable  trend,  so  the  following 
assumptions have been used to project emissions for land use and waste. 
•  0% increase per annum in emissions from land use change, as the historic 
emissions reflect substantial changes in land clearing regulation. There are not 
expected to be further substantial changes to land clearing regulation. 
•  0% increase per annum in emissions from waste. Although the trend has been 
slightly downward over the last 17 years, it is assumed that immigration and 
population growth will halt that trend. 
Using these assumptions as the basis for projecting future emissions, projects total emissions 
for Australia at the end of 2011 to be 607MtCO2e and emissions for the large polluters only 
to be 476MtCO2e (energy plus industrial emissions). 
Electricity generation emissions of CO2e as at 2008 were 204MtCO2e(Department of Climate 
Change, 2008). 
•  Electricity generation capacity as at 2007/08 is 51,068MW(ABARE, 2010) 
•  Include current energy projects due to be completed by 2011 of 3569MW(ABARE, 
2010), such that generation capacity at the end of 2011 would be 54,637MW. 
Using  2007/08  Generation  Emission  Intensity  factors  as  calculated  above  yields  carbon 
dioxide emissions for the year 2011 of 214MtCO2e from electricity generation of 54,637GW. 
 